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Safety Requirements 
• NASA’s human-rated safety requirements 
– Two-failure tolerance to catastrophic failures (JSC 20793) 
• Catastrophic for human-rating requires 
– No electrolyte venting that would cause permanent injury to crew or 
loss of vehicle or mission 
– Electrolytes that can cause permanent injury are rated as 
Toxicology level 2 for NASA human-rated missions 
• Lithium primary with an organic electrolyte and li-ion with organic 
electrolytes have a salt that is an irritant and corrrosive giving these 
electrolytes a Tox2 rating 
• The requirement therefore dictates that two-failure tolerance 
should be provided for all hazards that can lead to venting 
(electrolyte liquid), fire and thermal runaway. 
– For primary batteries this translates to two-failure tolerance to 
inadvertent charge, overdischarge into reversal, external and 
internal shorts, extreme temperatures especially high temps 
– Since no external controls exist for internal shorts, a design for 
minimum risk approach is used to mitigate that hazard. 
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Recommendations for Protective Features to 
Prevent Catastrophic Failures 
• Inadvertent charge shall be prevented 
– Between parallel primary lithium cells/cell strings 
– Between primary lithium cells and other charging sources 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Overdischarge into reversal 
– Prevent unbalanced cell condition (need for cell  
matching) 
– Prevent taking cells into low voltages and/ or  
reversal 
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Cells in parallel Cell strings in 
 parallel 
Redundancy in 
the case of  
mission critical  
applications 
Recommendations for Protective Features to 
Prevent Catastrophic Failures 
• External Shorts 
– High and low impedance short protection required 
– Fuses, PTCs, polyswitches, etc. shall be rated for the voltage, 
current and temperature of battery design and application as well 
as environment 
 
 
 
 
 
• Internal Short 
– Stringent cell and battery level screening (OCV, CCV, dimensions, 
mass, Re) 
– Cell matching 
– Rigorous battery flight acceptance testing that includes (vacuum) 
leak check and vibration screening with stringent pass/fail criteria for 
OCV, CCV (Re) and mass 
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 AED LiMnO2 battery 
AED for International Space Station (ISS) Human-rated 
Application (Flown in 2008 and has been on-orbit since) 
Original Design: Ultralife 5/4 C (U10021) high-rate cells; 4 in 
series; 1 diode in parallel to each cell; 2 TCOs one between cells 
1 & 2 and one between cells 3 & 4 
12 V; 6.2 Ah 
 
Original AED Battery Design 
J. Jeevarajan, Ph.D. /NASA-JSC 
Inadvertent Charge on Single Cell 
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Overdischarge of Unbalanced String of Four Cells 
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Overdischarge Into Reversal of Single Cell 
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Overdischarge of Unbalanced String of Four Cells 
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Heat-to-Vent Test on Single LiMnO2 AED Cell 
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Heat-to-Vent of Single Cell 
   
•  Originally, the cell was in the clamp on the ring stand.  
•  the cell went to the right, the feedthrough went towards the top to the left,  
•  the false cover went to the bottom left, 
•  the brick on the lower center was in alignment with the brick next to it (the  
bricks are 5 1/2 x 5 1/2 x 2 3/8 in.(14 x 14 x 6 cm) and weigh 5.8 lb (2.6 kg))  
X 
X 
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Simulated Internal Short (Crush) on Single Cell 
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External Short Circuit Test on a Single Cell 
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External Short Circuit Test on a Single Cell 
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External Short on a String of Four Cells 
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External Short on a String of Four Cells 
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External Short on a String of Four Cells 
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Summary of Test Results 
• Single cell tests were benign for external short, inadvertent charge and 
overdischarge into reversal up to 4.5 A.   
– At lower current loads cells die (may be due to excessive dendrite 
formation) benignly. 
• String level external short circuits lead to an unbalanced 
overdischarge, with one cell going into reversal.  The result is 
catastrophic violent venting. 
• Unbalanced string overdischarges at different currents causes 
catastrophic violent venting also. 
• Heat-to-vent is very dramatic displaying violent venting 
• Simulated internal short is also catastrophic and displays violent 
venting. 
 
• Battery is not UL-rated; hence does not have dual-fault tolerance or 
tolerance to inherent cell tolerance to failures 
Design Change as Recommended by NASA Battery 
Safety 
   
J. Jeevarajan, Ph.D. /NASA-JSC 
Original AED Battery Design  
NASA JSC AED Battery Design (currently on ISS) 
Summary and Conclusions 
• Single cell tests were benign for external short, inadvertent charge and 
overdischarge into reversal up to 4.5 A.   
– At lower current loads cells die (may be due to excessive dendrite 
formation) benignly. 
• String level external short circuits lead to an unbalanced 
overdischarge, with one cell going into reversal.  The result is 
catastrophic violent venting. 
• Unbalanced string overdischarges at different currents causes 
catastrophic violent venting also. 
• Heat-to-vent is very dramatic displaying violent venting 
• Simulated internal short is also catastrophic and displays violent 
venting. 
 
• Battery is not UL-rated; hence does not have dual-fault tolerance or 
tolerance to inherent cell tolerance to failures 
• Battery Design for NASA JSC’s human-rated application for use on ISS 
was changed to include two bypass diodes per cell to provide for two-
failure tolerance to overdischarge into reversal (and external short) 
hazards. 
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